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Green Mountain: A "Fleeting" Win for the States
Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie'
I. INTRODUCTION
As spring comes earlier and summer grows hotter, the phrase on
everyone's lips, from Presidential candidates to companies going green, is
global climate change. While the long-term effects of the increase in
greenhouse gases ("GHG") is still unknown, one thing is for certain: the
United States accounts for around one-third of the total GHGs in the
world. Therefore, it is up to Americans to take responsibility for global
pollution and begin to change how we live. Progressive states have already
begun to take action to curb carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles
within their own state boundaries by promulgating stricter emission
standards than the federal government has enacted. Vermont is just one of
those states trying to take a step toward creating a sustainable environment
for future generations.
On September 12, 2007, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Vermont upheld Vermont's regulations regarding the emission standards
for new automobiles that would apply to automakers' fleet of vehicles
beginning in 2009. Vermont adopted the standards established by
California in 2005. California has historically been allowed to experiment
with emission standards due to the state's high levels of pollution and the
state is permitted to apply for a waiver, submitted to the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"), of the national emission standards.
California's regulations have consistently been approved by the EPA.
Vermont's adoption of the regulations depended on the approval by the
EPA of California's proposed 2005 standards. At the time of the decision
of this case, California's application was still pending. Green Mountain
Chrysler Plymouth Jeep along with other new motor vehicle dealers,
automobile manufacturers, and associations of automobile manufacturers
subsequently brought a claim against Vermont on the ground that the
regulation was preempted by federal law and requested declaratory and
' Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F.Supp.2d 295 (D. Vt.
2007).
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injunctive relief under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United
States Constitution. The court concluded, that Vermont's adopted
regulations are not preempted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
("EPCA"), which provides that federal fuel economy standards preempt
any state laws or regulations related to fuel economy. The court also held
that Vermont's regulations do not undercut the foreign affairs objectives
of the President and the Congress.
The victory was illusory, however, due to the fact that the EPA
denied California's application for a waiver of the federal emission
standards in December 2007, the very standard Vermont sought to adopt.
As it stands now, the holding of the instant decision is moot because the
court's reasoning depended on the presumption that the adopted regulation
of Vermont would have approval by the EPA. Had the EPA approved the
standards submitted by California, this decision would have been a major
victory for states that were trying to reduce GHG emissions by regulating
the transportation sector. Now, states need to reduce the GHG emissions
from other sectors of the economy, such as the energy sector. For states
such as Missouri, the energy sector could become disproportionately
responsible for emission reductions where fossil fuels such as coal are the
primary sources of energy.
II. FACTS
In 2005, Vermont adopted a set of regulations that established
GHG emissions standards for new automobiles.2 However, new motor
vehicle dealers, automobile manufacturers, and associations of automobile
manufacturers brought a claim seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
from Vermont's regulations. 3 After the claim was filed, the State of New
York and five non-profit environmental advocacy groups intervened on
behalf of the defendants.4 The plaintiffs claimed that Vermont's





Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 and were preempted under the Clean
Air Act ("CAA"), and by United States' foreign policy.5
The alleged invalidity of Vermont's statute on preemption grounds
is based on the interplay and overlap of two federal statutes - the EPCA
and the CAA.6 The CAA requires that the EPA set standards to control air
pollutants emitted from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines
which cause or contribute to air pollution that may pose a danger to public
health or welfare.7 Additionally, the CAA preempts states from adopting
their own motor vehicle emission control standards. 8  However,
preemption is waived if standards that mirror those of California are
adopted by a state 9 so long as the EPA Administrator grants California a
waiver under § 209(b) of the CAA.10 States are permitted to adopt
California's standards as long as states adopt the standard at least two
years before the start of the model year.
In 2004, California adopted a set of GHG emissions regulations for
new motor vehicles and subsequently applied to the EPA for a waiver of
federal preemption under the CAA in 2005.12 At the time the instant
decision was decided, California's application for a waiver was still
pending.13 That same year, Vermont also adopted California's GHG
regulations.14 The court's decision was based on the presumption that
California's standards would be approved by the EPA, and subsequently
Vermont's standards would be as well, due to the fact that the EPA had
consistently granted California's applications for a waiver of preemption
previously. 15
The EPCA directs the Department of Transportation ("DOT") to






1o 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b), 209(b) (2000).
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To regulate motor vehicle fuel economy, the EPCA established a program
of "corporate average fuel economy," or "CAFE," standards. This statute
preempts any state law or regulation related to fuel economy standards.' 7
The plaintiffs challenged Vermont's regulations as being preempted by
EPCA because of the relationship between decreasing carbon dioxide
emission from the tailpipes of motor vehicles and increasing its fuel
economy. 18
The court proceeded on the assumption that the EPA would grant
California's waiver application' 9 and entered judgment in favor of
Vermont on the claims based on preemption under the EPCA and foreign
policy preemption while the claims under the CAA were dismissed as
moot.20
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Green Mountain deals with the intersecting requirements of two
important Environmental statutes: the Clean Air Act ("CAA") and the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act ("EPCA"). Under the CAA, the EPA
regulates motor vehicle emissions that are either harmful pollutants or
substances that form harmful pollutants. The federal fuel economy
standards are regulated under the EPCA and are administered by the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), an agency
within the U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT"). The Supreme
Court case Massachusetts v. EPA, also provided an impetus for the action
when it held that the EPA was required to regulate carbon dioxide
emissions from motor vehicles.
a. The Clean AirAct
The CAA was initially enacted in 1963 to improve air pollution





and create control programs. 2 1 The statute also recognized the dangers of
motor vehicle exhaust and stationary source emissions and required the
implementation of emission standards.22 With the enactment of the Air
Quality Act of 1967, federal government activities were expanded and the
new provision preempted states' power to set standards for emissions from
new motor vehicles and engines.23 Enforcement proceedings commenced
in those areas subject to interstate air pollution transport and the federal
government conducted extensive ambient monitoring studies and
stationary source inspections for the first time as part of the proceedings.24
Section 208(b) of the Air Quality Act provided a waiver from preemption
of federal standards for any state that had adopted standards, other than
crankcase emission standards, for the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 20, 1966.25
26California was the only state that satisfied this criterion. The new
provisions provided that California could set more stringent standards if it
had shown that it required such standards to meet compelling and
extraordinary conditions.27 In addition, the state had to show that the
standards were consistent with the federal emission standards.28
Most of the provisions of the CAA, however, were implemented in the
1970 and 1977 amendments and were written 29 at a time when public
pressure was building for government action to rectify the United States'
air pollution problems. 30 However, the amendments were not a direct
reaction to public pressure, but were aimed at correcting the failures of the
21 Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1963). (replacing the Air
Pollution Control Act of 1955).
22 id
23 Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
24 Environmental Protection Agency, History of the Clean Air Act,
http://www.epa.gov/air/caa//caa-history.html [hereinafter EPA History of CAA] (last
visited Aug. 13, 2008).
25 Air Quality Act of 1967, §208(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)).
2642 U.S.C. § 7543 (2000).27 d28 d
29 Clean Air Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676-1713 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7671 (2000)).
30 Paul Rogers, The Clean Air Act of 1970,
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/caa70/1l.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2008).
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previous regulations. 3 1 The amendments made air pollution primarily a
state responsibility and states were to address local and regional
problems. 32 The amendments required the EPA to publish national
ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") for pollutants such as carbon
monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, photochemical oxidants,
hydrocarbons, and particulate matter.33 Areas of each state were to be
classified as either in "attainment" or "nonattainment" of these
standards. 34 The CAA established deadlines for the states to develop state
implementation plans ("SIPs") to meet these standards. 3 5 The states had to
take inventory of emissions that contributed to local pollution which
caused it to exceed the NAAQS and develop measures which would
reduce the emissions to be in compliance with the NAAQS. 36 The 1977
amendments required the EPA to conduct a national review of overall air
quality every five years and to extend the deadline for states that had not
complied with NAAQS and motor vehicle emissions requirements of the
1970 CAA.37 These amendments established major permit review
requirements in order to ensure attainment and maintenance of the
NAAQS.
The 1990 amendments increased the authority and responsibility of the
federal government. 39 New regulatory programs were created to control
acid deposition (acid rain) and to issue stationary source operating
permits.4 o The National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
("NESHAPs") were incorporated to control toxic air pollutants and the
provisions for attainment and maintenance of NAAQS were modified and
expanded.4 1 These amendments required more specific requirements for
31 Id.
32 d
Jonathan S. Martel & Kerri L. Stelcen, Clean Air Regulation, in GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 133, 135 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007) [hereinafter Clean Air
Regulation].
34 d
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-10 (2000).
36 Clean Air Regulation, supra note 33, at 135.
n Act to Amend the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).






SIPs in order to bring local areas into attainment of NAAQS and added
new requirements for fuels, motor vehicles and nonroad engines.42 Other
provisions included in the amendments were regarded stratospheric ozone
protection, increased enforcement authority, and expanded research
programs. 43
Section 209(a) of the CAA preempts states from establishing their own
motor vehicle tailpipe emissions standards to control GHG.44 However, §
209(b) provides a waiver for a state that adopted motor vehicle emissions
standards prior to March 30, 1966 as long as the standards are "at least as
protective of public health and welfare as federal standards."45 California
is the only state that is allowed to receive a waiver under § 209(b) because
it is the only state that has established standards prior to March 30, 1966.46
Section 177 allows states that have adopted California's standards to also
receive a waiver so long as the standard does not require car
manufacturers to produce a "third car" (one that is different from the type
required by the California or federal standards).47
b. Energy Policy and Conservation Act
The 1975 Energy Policy and Conservation Act ("EPCA") was
enacted in response to the energy crisis of the 1970s and contains the
motor vehicle fuel economy laws. The EPCA was not originally enacted to
deal with climate change and does not reference any environmental
considerations.48 The Act was primarily enacted in response to the OPEC
oil embargo of 1973-74 and was designed to decrease the United State's
dependence on imports, to enhance national security, and to promote
42 Clean Air Regulation, supra note 36, at 136.
43 EPA History of CAA, supra note 24.
" 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000).
4 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1).
46 Clean Air Regulation, supra note 36, at 154.
47 d
48 Rachel L. Chanin, California's Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greehouse Gas
Emissions, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRV. AM. L. 699, 735. (2003) [hereinafter California's
Authority to Regulate].
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efficient energy use while insuring energy supply at reasonable cost. 49
Under § 502, the Secretary of Transportation is required to promulgate
rules that establish maximum feasible average fuel economy standards for
automobiles.50 In order to regulate motor vehicle fuel economy, the EPCA
established a program of "corporate average fuel economy" (CAFE)
standards.5 ' CAFE requires each automobile manufacturer or importer to
meet average fuel economy standards for the fleet of new vehicles it
manufactures or imports in each model year.52 The Act regulates the GHG
emissions from motor vehicles since carbon dioxide emissions are used to
measure fuel economy under the EPCA. Fuel economy is determined by
measuring how much carbon dioxide a vehicle emits and then uses a
formula to convert those carbon dioxide emissions in the number of miles
that vehicle can travel on a gallon of gasoline (miles per gallon).54
Therefore, the more carbon dioxide that is emitted from a vehicle's
tailpipe, the lower the fuel efficiency of the vehicle. The CAFE standards
do not apply to individual vehicles or models, rather they regulate a
manufacturer's entire fleet of cars or trucks. 5 Therefore, a manufacturer
can produce a combination of cars as long as the fuel economy of the
entire fleet as a whole meets or exceeds the required average miles per
gallon.56
The regulation provides special treatment for vehicles that utilize
alternative fuel57 and CAFE provides a credit system as well.
Manufacturers earn credits if the average fuel economy of either a
manufacturer's passenger car or light truck fleet for a particular model
year exceeds the established standard. Credits can then be applied to any
three consecutive model years immediately prior or subsequent to the
49 See H.R. REP. No. 94-340, at 1 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1762, 1763-
64.
s 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a)-(c) (2000).
5' Complaint, T 34 Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508
F.Supp.2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007) (No.2:05-CV-302).
52 See generally 49 U.S.C. §32902 (2000).
s3 Clean Air Regulation, supra note 36, at 134.
54 Complaint, supra note 59.
"Id. at 35.
56 Id at 36.
5 49 U.S.C. § 32908(b)(3) (2000).
8 See id. § 32903(a)-(b).
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model year in which the credits are earned. 59 However, these credits
cannot be passed between manufacturers or between fleets (for example,
between domestic passenger cars and light trucks). 6 0 As under the CAA,
states are also preempted under § 509 of the EPCA from adopting or
enforcing regulations inconsistent with federal regulations concerning fuel
economy standards or fuel costs. 6 1 The federal government has exclusive
authority to "determine and enforce" fuel economy standards. 62
c. Massachusetts v. EPA
Until 2007, the Supreme Court of the United States had not
acknowledged the graveness of change in climate. However, in its
decision Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court recognized the jurisdiction of
the EPA to regulate and set emission limits of GHGs. Through this
decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of conserving
sources of energy, choosing alternative sources of energy over fossil fuels,
and being aware of the fact that the United States is dependent on energy
for transportation, industry, recreation, and other aspects of our daily
lives. 63 Currently, 17 states and two cities are pushing the EPA for its
action plan to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles. 64
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The automakers advanced two main arguments challenging
Vermont's regulations: (1) the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
preempted Vermont's regulations, both expressly and implicitly; and (2)
9 Id. § 32903(a)(1)-(2).
0 Id. § 32903(e).
" Id..§ 32919(b).
62 Chanin, California's Authority to Regulate, supra note 48, at 733.
63 Matthew Bender & Co., Global warming Revolution and Its Impact, 2-1A TREATISE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1A.03 (2007).
6 Cities Accuse EPA of Stalling Following Massachusetts Remand, 21-5 MEALEY'S
POLLUTION LIABILITY REP. 4 (2008).
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Vermont's regulations intrude upon the foreign affairs interests of the
President and Congress.
a. EPCA Preemption
The court first addressed the express and implied preemption claim
under the EPCA. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
proclaims that state laws that are contrary to or interfere with federal laws
are invalid.65 The automakers argued that the regulations under EPCA
expressly and implicitly preempt the state's GHG regulations.66 The
express provision in the statute prohibits states from adopting or enforcing
a law or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel
economy standards for automobiles covered by the standard. The
automakers claimed that Vermont's attempt to regulate emissions was a defacto fuel economy standard, which is for the federal government to
establish not a state. In the alternative, they argued that even if the
standards were not a de facto fuel economy standard, they were at least
"related to fuel economy standards," and were therefore preempted by the
EPCA.
On the assumption that the EPA would approve California's
waiver of its standards, the court disagreed with the automakers that
Vermont's regulation was preempted by the federal EPCA statute.68 Since
the waiver would allow California's emission to be on the same
authoritative level as the federal standards, Vermont's regulations would
be as well and neither would be preempted by the statute.6 9 Additionally,
in response to Massachusetts v. EPA, President Bush issued an executive
order that required agencies to cooperate with one another to protect the
environment with respect to GHG emissions from motor vehicles.70
Therefore, the court found that if a conflict between a state emissions
standard undergoing EPA waiver review and as CAFE standard
65 Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F.Supp.2d 295, 343(D. Vt. 2007).
6 Id.67 id.





promulgated by NHTSA arose, the EPA and NHTSA would cooperate in a
joint accommodation or resolution to solve the problem.7 Essentially, this
case involved "potential conflict between 'federal' provisions." The
court also reasoned that once the EPA grants a waiver, the state's
regulations become "other motor vehicle standards of the Government,"
which is a factor that the EPCA requires NHTSA to consider when setting
fuel economy standards. For these reasons, the court held that the
preemption doctrines do not apply as to the intersection between Section
209(b) of the CAA and EPCA.7
Although the court found that the preemption doctrine was
inapplicable in this case, the court went on to address the manufacturers'
preemption arguments. The court noted that because Vermont's standards
regulated additional pollutants and not just carbon dioxide emissions,75 the
court found that the regulations were not de facto fuel economy
standards.76 The Court noted that while the bulk of the GHG regulations
pertain to carbon dioxide, they still include emissions which are not
connected to fuel economy.77
71 Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 13,432, 72 Fed.Reg. 27,717 (May 14, 2004)) The
executive order requires the coordination of regulatory action to be undertaken jointly
and/or in consultation with other agencies when possible. Exec. Order No. 13,432, 72
Fed.Reg. 27,717 (May 14, 2004)
72 Id. at 398.
73 id.
74 Green Mountain, 508 F.Supp.2d at 302 at 349.
7 Id. at 351-52. Carbon dioxide is the principal emission that is regulated by the GHG
emission standards. A manufacturer can comply with GHG regulations by improving the
fuel economy of the vehicles it produces. However, GHG regulations are not simply a
fuel economy standard because fuel economy deals only with how much carbon dioxide
is produced while the GHG regulations deal with a multitude of pollutants such as
methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons and carbon dioxide. Id.
76 Id at 353. Vermont and calf regulations are not fuel economy standards because they
allow manufactures to comply through various means such as receiving credits for air
conditioning, or using alternative fuels, or using plug-in hybrid vehicles. Also, they
contain regulations for upstream emissions adjustments for com ethanol, liquid petroleum
gas, or propane, and compressed natural gas. Additionally, the regulations allow for
adjustment of GHG emission n values for energy sources that don't have tailpipe
emissions of GHG, such as electricity and hydrogen. Id.
7 Id. at 353.
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Additionally, the court noted that while the text of the EPCA
prohibits states from adopting or enforcing laws that are "related to" fuel
economy standards, is too general and there is no evidence of
Congressional intent concerning its limits. 78 Also, there is a specific
requirement to accept EPA-approved California emissions regulations into
consideration which supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend
to preempt these regulations. 79 The court held that the preemption
doctrines do not apply because the auto manufacturers failed to show that
Congress expressed a clear and manifest intent to designate the regulation
of carbon dioxide emissions for motor vehicles under the exclusive
domain of the federal government.8 0
The court then examined the manufacturer's claim of conflict
preemption. A conflict preemption exists if a state law conflicts with a
federal statute or regulation or is an obstacle to accomplishing or
executing Congressional objectives.8 1 The automakers contended that the
state's regulation would conflict with the Federal CAFE program. They
argued that it would frustrate Congressional intent to create a unitary,
nationwide fuel economy standard. It would restrict consumer choice,
reduce employment in the domestic automobile industry and decrease
traffic safety. According to the automakers, these factors would disturb the
balance that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
("NHTSA") settled on when it set "maximum feasible average fuel
economy" levels82, and EPA's waiver process would not eliminate a
conflict with EPCA objectives. 83
The legislative history of the EPCA and the CAA as well as the
agencies' practices shows that there is no conflict between the CAA's
mandate to regulate air pollution and that of the EPCA to regulate fuel
economy. The court was not convinced that consumers would be
deprived of their choice of vehicles or that manufacturers would be forced
" Id. at 354.
79id.
sold. at 355.
81 Id. (citing Int'l Paper co. v. Ouellette, 479 US 481, 492 (1987)).




to curtail or abandon their product lines.85 Additionally, the evidence
provided by the plaintiffs failed to persuade the court that traffic safety
will decrease as a result of the regulations.86
The court also found that the evidence provided by the
manufacturers failed to show that the auto industry would not be able to
meet the challenges posed by the stricter regulations.87 The court further
stated that the automakers will be able to meet the challenges because of
the industry's ability to "develop and utilize new technologies to increase
fuel efficiency and reduce emissions."88 In addition, the EPA would have
the ability to give automakers additional lead time through the use of the
waiver process if it would be necessary to develop the technology. 89
Finally, the court held that the manufacturers failed to show that Congress'
purposes and objectives had been frustrated by Vermont's GHG
regulation.90
b. Foreign Policy Preemption
The last argument the court addressed was the foreign policy
preemption. The automakers claimed that Vermont's GHG regulations
encroached upon the United States foreign policy and the foreign affairs
goals of the President and Congress. 91 The automakers argued that it
conflicts with the United States' ability to participate in multilateral
agreements for the reduction of international GHG emissions, reduces its
bargaining power, and impedes the United States' ability to "speak with
one voice upon matters of global climate change." 92 The court concluded
that the manufacturers failed to demonstrate that the state's regulation
intruded upon the field of foreign affairs or that it conflicted with a
8 1Id. at 359.
86 id.
8 1 d. at 399.
88 id.
89 id.
90 Id. at 357.
9 Id. at 392.9 2 Id. (citing Plaintiffs Compl. T 121).
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national foreign policy.93 The District Court of Vermont ordered judgment
for Vermont on all counts.
V. COMMENT
Global climate change is a major issue for courts and legislators
today. During the last 100 years, the Earth's average surface temperature
has increased by about 1.2 to 1.4 degrees Fahrenheit. 94 Climate models
predict that the average temperature at the Earth's surface could increase
from 3.2 to 7.2 degrees Fahrenheit above 1990 levels by the end of this
century if greenhouse gases continue to increase. 95 The nine warmest
years in this century have all occurred in the last 14 years.9 The United
States' energy-related activities account for three-quarters of the human-
generated greenhouse gas emissions, which come primarily in the form of
carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels. 97 More than half of
the energy-related emissions come from sources such as power plants and
about a third of the emissions come from transportation. Other sources of
greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. are industrial processes (production
of cement, steel, and aluminum), agriculture, forestry, and waste
management.98 The level of carbon dioxide continues to increase and soon
will reach 400 parts per million ("ppm") in the earth's atmosphere, which
is the highest amount in 650,000 years. 99 This level could rise to 500 ppm
by 2050 unless drastic measures are taken. 00 Around the globe, public
awareness is growing and litigation is mounting. We are embarking on an
environmental revolution.
9 Id. 397.
94 Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basicinfo.html [hereinafter EPA Climate Change].95 id.
96 Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change and Missouri,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/SHSU5BUTGH/$File
/mo impct.pdf (1997) [hereinafter Climate Change and Missouri].
97 Id.
98Id
99 Matthew Bender & Co., Coping with Global Warming: A Critical Summary of




Missouri is also aware that if global warming occurs, it could have
serious consequences for the state's citizens and economy. According to
the projections made by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
by 2100 temperatures in Missouri could increase by about two degrees
Fahrenheit in the summer and about three degrees Fahrenheit in other
seasons. ' 01 Additionally, it is predicted that precipitation will increase and
extreme hot days in the summer will increase due to the general warming
trend.102 While similar changes have occurred in the past, those changes
took place over the course of centuries rather than decades.10 3 Missouri
has taken steps to address climate change issues and in 1994 it began two
projects to fight global warming.104 The first project compiled information
on statewide GHG emissions for 1990 and was completed in 1996. The
second project evaluated GHG emission trends, predicted future statewide
GHG emissions, and "identifie[d] and analyze[d] options for reducing the
state's contribution to global GHG emissions." 05
While the instant decision made by the Vermont Court at first
blush seemed encouraging for those states that want to take more
aggressive steps towards combating the causes of global warming, all
illusions of progress disappeared when the head of the EPA, Stephen
Johnson, denied California's waiver petition. On December 19, 2007,
Johnson published the official explanation of his decision to deny a waiver
of preemption for California's emission standards.' 06 The agency stated
that new legislation signed by President Bush setting a unified federal fuel
economy standard for vehicles of 35 miles per gallon provides sufficient
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from cars and trucks throughout
the United States.' 0 7 The agency felt this would be a more effective
101 Climate Change and Missouri, supra note 96.
102 id
103id.
104 John Noller, Missouri Action Options for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
available at http://www.dnr.mo.gov/pubs/pub1447.pdf. (2002) [hereinafter MO Action
Options].
105 Id.
106 California Sues EPA Over Denial of Waiver Request for Emissions Regulations, 21-4
MEALEY'S POLLUTION LIABILITY REP. 1 (2008).
1o7 id.
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approach to the reduction of emissions than a partial state-by-state
approach of 33.8 miles per gallon. 0 8
Arnold Schwarzenegger, the governor of California, however, felt
that although the new federal standard would help the United States
reduce its dependency on foreign oil, it did not constitute grounds for
denying the state's waiver. 109 According to the governor, California's
vehicle greenhouse gas standards were designed to combat climate change
through 2050, whereas the federal standards do not reflect a vision to deal
with climate change beyond 2020.110 The EPA's denial of California's
waiver application raises concerns about the United States' ability to make
aggressive changes to combat global warming because of the lack of
initiative taken by Washington and the Bush Administration and by
preventing states from filling that void in leadership.
In Missouri, the utility sector and the transportation sector of the
economy accounted for an 88 percent increase carbon dioxide emissions
between 1990 and 1996.111 Carbon dioxide emissions from coal accounted
for more than 99 percent of the utility sector's increase and 99 percent of
the increase in the transportation sector came from carbon dioxide
emissions from petroleum-based fuels.1 2 Although a large portion of
carbon dioxide emissions does come from the utility sector, the primary
source of carbon dioxide emissions in transportation is personal travel
(gasoline).1 13
Since the EPA denied California's waiver, Missouri will be forced
to look to the utility sector of its economy to reduce GHG rather than the
problem sector, transportation. The sector of the economy for Missouri to
target would be electric generation to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.
Electric generation relies on centralized coal-fired plants, which is the
main source of GHG emissions in Missouri. Missouri has many options to
reduce emissions in this area such as increasing the industry's efficiency,
switching the fuel energy-source from fossil fuel to something that








such as energy from wind, solar thermal energy, photovoltaic cells and
panels, crops specifically grown for energy production, organic waste
biomass, and hydropower.
Other states as well will be forced to look to other sectors of their
economies to reduce GHG emissions if they cannot be cut in the
transportation section. After Massachusetts v. EPA, the court recognized
that the EPA has authority to regulate GHG emissions from automobiles.
However, the agency has not established a federal standard, and states
have been initiating their own. With California's application denied, states
will have to accept the federal standard and look to other industries and
sources to cut emissions, while they wait for the EPA to aggressively
regulate automobile emissions. With a new President in office, how strict
the standards will be depends upon the new President's appointment for
the head of the EPA.
For the moment, things may look bleak for California and other
progressive states, but all could change with the upcoming Presidential
election. While Senator John McCain proposes an increase in auto fuel
economy to 35 mpg (the same standard already implemented by the
administration) and opposes a 40 mpg standard, Senator Barack Obama
favors increasing the standard to 40 mpg. Senator Hillary Clinton
however, has a mixed track record regarding her stance on fuel economy.
In 2003, she supported an increase to 40 mpg, but in 2005, she opposed it.
Both Democratic candidates, however, support cutting emissions by 80
percent by 2050. The EPA's stance could change depending on which
candidate takes office.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Green Mountain depended upon the EPA's waiver
of California's emission standards since Vermont had based their own
regulations upon those established by California. However, as indicated by
the court in the instant decision,"l 4 because California's wavier application
was denied, Vermont's regulation is preempted by § 209(a) of the CAA.
114 Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F.Supp.2d 295, 302
(D. Vt. 2007).
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States that had chosen to adopt California's emission standards are now
forced to look to regulation of other sectors of the economy in order to
reduce carbon dioxide levels. The EPA's denial of California's waiver
impedes the state's ability to move forward with its ambitious vehicle
emission program. A total of 18 states, representing 45% of the nation's
auto market, which adopted or wanted to adopt California's standards, will
not be able to pursue their programs either. States will have to rely on the
EPA to establish a more aggressive action plan to combat the rising levels
of GHG emissions or drastically cut emissions from other sectors of their
economies. Although the EPA's denial of California's proposed standards
was a loss for those states taking steps to reduce carbon dioxide emissions,
the Presidential election of 2008 may change nothing or everything.
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